CEREC - Jean-François Caulier

center for research in economics

Jean-François Caulier Contact Information Current Appointments Research Interests Working Papers Teaching|

Contact Information
caulier@fusl.ac.be or Jean-Francois.Caulier@univ-paris1.fr
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre D'Economie de la Sorbonne
Phone: +32 495 94 16 63
112-116 Bd de l'Hôpital
75013 Paris
France

Click here to download my C.V. (Last update : January 2011)

Current Appointments

Post-doc researcher at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Research Interests

Game Theory, Networks, Political Economy, Power Indices, Coalition Theory

Working Papers (Downloadable)

The Effective Number of Relevant Parties (joint with P. Dumont), CEREC Working paper, 2003/7.
Ordered Sets and Lattices. Application to Coalitional Networks, mimeo(2007).
Network Games as TU Cooperative games, mimeo (2009).
A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU cooperative games, CEREC Working paper 2009/2.
The Interpretation of the Laakso-Taagepera Effective Number of Parties, 2011.

Publications

"The Effective Number of Relevant Parties: How Power Indices Improve the Laakso-Taagepera's Index", with P. Dumont. Under revision (Journal of Theoretical Politics).
"Measuring one-party dominance with Voting Power Indices", with P. Dumont, in Dominant Political Parties and Democracy, Ed. M. Bogaards and F. Boucek, Routledge, (2010).
"Contractually Stable Networks", with A. Mauleon and V. Vannetelbosch 2010. NAJ Economics 13. and under revision (Games and Economic Behavior).

Teaching

Teaching Assistant, Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis (Bruxelles) :

Game Theory (STAT A57) (2005-2007, 2009-2010),
Industrial Organization (ECOG 828) (2007-2009),
Séminaire de Principes et Méthodes en Sciences Economiques (2003-2006),
Principles of Economics (2002-2004),
Economie Politique (2002-2004),
Microéconomie (2002-2004)

Teaching, Université Paris 5 Descartes :

Economie Industrielle, (ECO 3) (2010-2011).

Last update : January 20th, 2011.