CEREC - Jean-François Caulier

center for research in economics

Jean-François Caulier Contact Information Current Appointments Research Interests Working Papers Teaching|

Contact Information
caulier@fusl.ac.be
Phone: +32 2 211 7944
Fax: +32 2 211 7997
43 Blvd du Jardin Botanique
1000 Brussels, Belgium

Click here to download my C.V. (Last update : November 2009)

Current Appointments

PhD Candidate at FUSL, Académie Universitaire Louvain (Completion : 2010)
Job Market Applicant

Research Interests

Game Theory, Networks, Political Economy, Power Indices, Coalition Theory

Working Papers (Downloadable)

The Effective Number of Relevant Parties (joint with P. Dumont), CEREC Working paper, 2003/7.
Ordered Sets and Lattices. Application to Coalitional Networks, mimeo(2007).
Network Games as TU Cooperative games, mimeo (2009).
A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU cooperative games, CEREC Working paper 2009/2.

Publications

"The Effective Number of Relevant Parties: How Power Indices Improve the Laakso-Taagepera's Index", with P. Dumont. Under revision (Journal of Theoretical Politics).
"Measuring one-party dominance with Voting Power Indices", with P. Dumont, in Dominant Political Parties and Democracy, Ed. M. Bogaards and F. Boucek, Routledge, (2010).
"Contractually Stable Networks", with A. Mauleon and V. Vannetelbosch May 2009. NAJ Economics 13.

Teaching

Teaching Assistant in :

Game Theory (STAT A57) (2005-2007, 2009-2010),
Industrial Organization (ECOG 828) (2007-2009),
Séminaire de Principes et Méthodes en Sciences Economiques (2003-2006),
Principles of Economics (2002-2004),
Economie Politique (2002-2004),
Microéconomie (2002-2004)