Bargaining and delay in patent licensing†

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Abstract

We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royalties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.

Keywords: Patent licensing, fixed fee, royalty, bargaining, private information.

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1 Introduction

A license on a patent protected technology consists of a contract for which its legal holder gives the right to exploit the technology to a third party (licensee) in exchange for some up-front fixed fee or royalties. Patent licensing is a profitable practice for the innovator to diffuse the innovation. The innovator can be either an outside innovator or one of the incumbent producers in the industry. The theoretical literature on licensing of cost-reducing innovations has mainly considered outside innovators who have full bargaining power. That is, innovators are able to impose some up-front fixed fee or per-unit royalty. In industries where firms compete à la Cournot, licensing by means of per-unit royalties turns to be inferior to licensing by means of posting an up-front fixed fee or auctioning licenses for an outside innovator, regardless the industry size and the innovation size (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Kamien, Oren and Tauman, 1992).

However, there is some evidence that the relative bargaining power of a patent holder and a licensee greatly influences the price of patents in licensing negotiations. Sakakibara (2010) has empirically examined the determinants of the price of patent licensing using data about 661 patent licensing contracts in Japan which took place between 1998 and 2003. She has found that factors affecting the profitability of patents and the bargaining power of the patent holder are good predictors of per-unit royalties, while proxies for the reservation price of patent holders are less important for the determination of per-unit royalties. In addition, she has found that the fit of the per-unit royalty regression is always better than that of the fixed fee regression, suggesting that the per-unit royalty represents patent licensing price better than fixed fee payment.

1Sen (2005a) has shown that if the number of licenses can take only integer values, then for an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly, royalty licensing could be superior to both fixed fee and auction. Sen and Tauman (2007) have analyzed optimal combinations of up-front fees and per-unit royalties for cost-reducing innovations for both outside and incumbent innovators.

2Based on survey data, Caves, Crookwell and Killing (1983) have found that on average only 40 percent of the rent from licensed technology is captured by a patent holder.

3Empirical studies have shown the wide prevalence of per-unit royalties in practice. For instance, Rostoker (1984) and Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo (1996) have found that licensing by means of up-front fixed fees is less frequently used than choosing per-unit royalties or combinations of up-front fees and royalties. Vishwasrao (2007) has considered a data set of all the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing firms in India between 1989 and 1993. Industry, firm, and contract characteristics are used to explain differences between the forms of payment in licensing contracts. She has found that licensing contracts are more
In the present paper we consider a model of licensing of a non-dramatic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royalties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. The main feature of our model is that both the patent holder and the firms may have private information. To describe the bargaining process, we adopt Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information, which allows for the occurrence of delays in equilibrium.

We find that, under complete information, the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. In addition, per-unit royalties may be the optimal choice even if the bargaining with two-sided incomplete information is close to one with complete information.

We also obtain that the maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties and remains finite even when the period length between two offers shrinks to zero. When brands are substitutable, royalty settlements create spillover effects (by altering the firms’ relative competitive positions in the product market) that have implications for the outcome of negotiations. Spillover effects drive the parties to concede more rapidly. In case of per-unit royalties, the number of licenses sold has an ambiguous effect on the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement. When the patent holder chooses complete technology diffusion, firms have incentives to concede more rapidly because of increased spillover effects. However, complete technology diffusion raises the potential payoffs for the patent holder, and in expanding the payoff set, also increases the scope for delay (longer negotiations may be needed for screening the private information). In case of up-front fixed fees, the rents to be divided do not depend on the negotiated fees. Hence, the maximum likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high, while increased volatility of sales and greater profitability favor fixed fee contracts.

Notice that the prevalence of royalties over fixed fees in practice can be explained, for instance, by Bertrand competition (Muto, 1993), spatial competition (Caballero-Sanz, Moner-Colonques and Sempere-Monerris, 2002; Poddar and Sinha, 2004), variation in the quality of innovation (Rockett, 1990), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985; Wang 1998, Kamien and Tauman, 2002), or asymmetry of information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1991; Beggs, 1992; Sen, 2005b).
real delay time in reaching an agreement in case of up-front fixed fees is greater than the one in case of per-unit royalties.

Thus, the relative bargaining power of a patent holder and a licensee provides a rationale for the wide prevalence of royalties in practice. Royalty could dominate fixed fee even if parties have almost complete information, independently of the intensity of the market competition. In addition, the likelihood of having more inefficient outcomes in case of licensing by means of up-front fixed fees may explain why licensing by means of per-unit royalties is commonly used in practice.

The existing literature of patent licensing under asymmetric information has considered other sources of asymmetry that may explain the prevalence of royalties over fixed fees in practice. In Gallini and Wright (1990), the value of the innovation is private information to the innovator and the innovator is the only party who can make offers. In Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991), the value of the innovation is private information to the buyer (a monopolist) and the innovator is the only party who can make offers. In Beggs (1992), the value of the innovation is private information to the buyer (a monopolist) and the monopolist is the only party who can make offers. In Sen (2005b), the marginal cost of production is private information to the buyer (a monopolist) and the innovator is the only party who can make offers. So, in all these models either the innovator has full bargaining power or the firm has full bargaining power. In this paper, we provide a model of licensing where both the innovator (patent holder) and the firms (duopolists) have private information and can make offers and counter-offers. In addition, our model can explain the number of days between the date of application of the licensed patents and the date of the licensing contracts as reported in Sakakibara (2010) and the effects of market competition on price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented and we describe and solve the up-front fixed fee (per-unit royalty) bargaining games for the case of complete information. In Section 3 we analyzes the up-front fixed fee (per-unit royalty) bargaining games with private information and we derive the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 Model

We consider a duopolistic industry. Each firm is producing one brand of a differentiated product. Let firm \( i \) produce brand \( i \) in quantity \( q_i \). There is no entry or threat of entry, and both firms are quantity setters (Cournot competition). The inverse demand function for the brand \( i \) of the differentiated product is given by \( p_i(q_i, q_j) = a - q_i - \gamma q_j, \; i \neq j \). The parameter \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \) represents the degree of substitutability between both brands. The higher the \( \gamma \), the higher is the degree of substitutability between \( i \) and \( j \). When \( \gamma = 0 \), each firm becomes a monopolist; when \( \gamma = 1 \), both brands are perfect substitutes. With the old technology, both firms produce with the identical constant marginal cost \( c \) where \( 0 < c < a \). An outside innovator (the patent holder) has been granted a patent for a non-drastic innovation that reduces the marginal cost from \( c \) to \( c - \varepsilon \). A non-drastic innovation is such that the non-purchasing firm would produce a positive quantity at equilibrium. Without loss of generality we set \( (a - c) = 1; \; \varepsilon \in (0, 1) \) is the innovation size. The patent holder decides to license the new technology to one or both firms but cannot enter the market of the final good directly.

The strategic interaction between the patent holder and the duopolists is modelled as a three-stage game. In the first stage, the patent holder decides how many licenses to sell (complete technology diffusion or exclusive licensing) and the licensing schemes (a non-negative up-front fixed fee or a non-negative per-unit linear royalty). In the second stage, the patent holder and the duopolists bargain either over a fixed fee or a per-unit royalty. In the third stage, the Cournot competition takes place. The model is solved backwards. Let \( \Pi_i (\Pi_i) \) be firm \( i \)'s Nash equilibrium profits when both firms produce with the old (new) technology. Let \( \overline{\Pi}_i (\overline{\Pi}_i) \) be firm \( i \)'s Nash equilibrium profits when firm \( i \) produces with the new (old) technology while firm \( j \) produces with the old (new) technology, \( j \neq i \). In case of non-negative up-front fixed fees, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi^F_i &= \left[ \frac{1}{2 + \gamma} \right]^2, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{1}{2 + \gamma}; \\
\overline{\Pi}^F_i &= \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2 - F, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}; \\
\Pi^F_i &= \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) - \gamma\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{(2 - \gamma) - \gamma\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}; \\
\overline{\Pi}^F_i &= \left[ \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + \gamma} \right]^2 - F, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + \gamma};
\end{align*}
\]
where $F_i$ is the up-front fixed fee which is negotiated between the patent holder and firm $i$. In case of non-negative per-unit royalties, we have

$$
\Pi_i^R = \left[ \frac{1}{2 + \gamma} \right]^2, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{1}{2 + \gamma};
$$

$$
\Pi_i^R = \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2(\varepsilon - R_i)}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2(\varepsilon - R_i)}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)};
$$

$$
\Pi_i^R = \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) - \gamma (\varepsilon - R_j)}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{(2 - \gamma) - \gamma (\varepsilon - R_j)}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)};
$$

$$
\Pi_i^R = \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma)(1 + \varepsilon) - 2R_i + \gamma R_j}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2, \text{ and } q_i = \frac{(2 - \gamma)(1 + \varepsilon) - 2R_i + \gamma R_j}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)};
$$

where $R_i$ is the per-unit royalty which is negotiated between the patent holder and firm $i$.

### 2.1 Fixed fee licensing game

We denote by $F(k)$ the fixed fee licensing game where the patent holder decides to sell $k$ licenses in the first stage.

We first consider the fixed fee licensing game with exclusive licensing, $F(1)$, where the patent holder and firm $i$ negotiate over the up-front fixed fee $F_i$. Production and market competition occur only when either the patent holder and firm $i$ have come to an agreement, or when one of the parties has decided to leave the bargaining table forever.

The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. The patent holder and firm $i$ make alternate fixed fee offers, with firm $i$ making offers in odd-numbered periods and the patent holder making offers in even-numbered periods. The length of each period is $\Delta$. The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the negotiators accepts an offer. No limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a possible outcome. In case no agreement is reached between the patent holder and firm $i$, the patent holder cannot try to reach an agreement with firm $j$. Thus, firm $j$ will continue producing with the old technology. The patent holder and firm $i$
are assumed to be impatient. The patent holder and firm \( i \) have time preferences with constant discount rates \( r_p > 0 \) and \( r_f > 0 \), respectively. To capture the notion that the time it takes to come to terms is small relative to the life of the patent, we assume that the time between periods is very small. This allows a study of the limiting situations in which the bargaining procedure is essentially symmetric and the potential costs of delaying agreement by one period can be regarded as negligible.

As the interval between offers and counteroffers shortens and shrinks to zero, the alternating-offer model has a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which approximates the Nash bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986). Thus the predicted fixed fee is given by

\[
F_{i}^{\text{SPE}}(1) = \arg \max \left[ F_i \right]^{\alpha} \cdot \left[ \left( \frac{2 - \gamma}{2 - \gamma + 2\varepsilon} \right)^2 - F_i \right]^{1-\alpha} 
\]

where \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) is the patent holder bargaining power which is equal to \( r_f/(r_p + r_f) \) and the status quo payoffs are zero, subject to firm \( i \)'s outside option of not buying the license \( (\Pi_i^F \geq \Pi_i^F) \) if and only if \( 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \geq F_i \). Then, the equilibrium fixed fee is equal to

\[
F_{i}^{\text{SPE}}(1) = \frac{\alpha (2 (1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^2}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2} \quad \text{if} \quad \alpha \leq \alpha_i^F
\]

and to \( 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \) if \( \alpha > \alpha_i^F \), where the upper limit on the patent holder bargaining power that guarantees that firm \( i \) prefers the Nash bargaining solution to the outside option is given by \( \alpha_i^F \equiv 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) (2 (1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^{-2} \).

The patent holder’s equilibrium revenue, \( V_{i}^{F^*}(1) \), is equal to \( F_{i}^{\text{SPE}}(1) \). Firm \( i \)'s equilibrium profits are equal to

\[
\Pi_{i}^{F^*}(1) = \frac{(1 - \alpha) (2 (1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^2}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2} \quad \text{if} \quad \alpha \leq \alpha_i^F
\]

and to \( 4 (1 - \gamma) + \gamma^2) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \) if \( \alpha > \alpha_i^F \).

\( ^6 \)The Rubinstein’s alternating-offer bargaining model provides a useful guide for the interpretation and identification of the status quo or disagreement point in static models. The interpretation of the status quo is no loss no gains as compared with the players’ positions during the negotiation. So, it is not the outside options of the bargaining parties which are defined to be the best alternatives that players can obtain if they withdraw from the bargaining process. The presence of outside options just places restrictions on the solution. See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
We now consider the fixed fee licensing game with complete technology diffusion, \( F(2) \), where the patent holder and firm 1 negotiate over the up-front fixed fee \( F_1 \) while the patent holder and firm 2 negotiate over the up-front fixed fee \( F_2 \). The negotiations occur simultaneously and the agents are unaware of any proposals made (or settlement reached) in related negotiations. Hence, each pair of negotiators takes the decisions of the other pair as given while conducting its own negotiation. Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. Then, the predicted fixed fees are given by

\[
F_{i}^{SPE}(2) = \arg \max \left[ F_{i} \right] \cdot \left[ \left( \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + \gamma} \right)^2 - F_{i} \right]^{1-\alpha},
\]

\( i = 1, 2, i \neq j \), where the status quo payoffs are zero, subject to firm \( i \)'s outside option of not buying the license (\( \Pi_{i}^{F} \geq \Pi_{i}^{F} \)). Notice that \( \Pi_{i}^{F} \geq \Pi_{i}^{F} \) if and only if \( 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon (1 - \gamma) - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \geq F_{i} \). Then, the equilibrium fixed fees are equal to

\[
F_{i}^{SPE}(2) = \frac{\alpha (1 + \varepsilon)^{2}}{(2 + \gamma)^{2}} \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha_{2}^{F}
\]

and to \( 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon (1 - \gamma) - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \) if \( \alpha > \alpha_{2}^{F} \), where the upper limit on \( \alpha \) that guarantees that firm \( i \) prefers the Nash bargaining solution to the outside option is given by \( \alpha_{2}^{F} \equiv 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon (1 - \gamma) - \gamma) (1 + \varepsilon)^{-2} (2 - \gamma)^{-2} \). with \( \alpha_{2}^{F} > \alpha_{1}^{F} \). The patent holder’s equilibrium revenue is equal to

\[
V_{F}^{*}(2) = \frac{2\alpha (1 + \varepsilon)^{2}}{(2 + \gamma)^{2}} \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha_{2}^{F}
\]

and to \( 8\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon (1 - \gamma) - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \) if \( \alpha > \alpha_{2}^{F} \). Firm \( i \)'s equilibrium profits are equal to

\[
\Pi_{i}^{F^{*}}(2) = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \varepsilon)^{2}}{(2 + \gamma)^{2}} \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha_{2}^{F}
\]

and to \( (4 (1 - \gamma (1 + \varepsilon)) + \gamma^{2} (1 + 2\varepsilon + \varepsilon^{2})) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \) if \( \alpha > \alpha_{2}^{F} \). Comparing \( V_{F}^{*}(1) \) with \( V_{F}^{*}(2) \) we obtain the following lemma. The proof of this lemma, as well as the other proofs, may be found in the appendix.

**Lemma 1.** Consider the fixed fee licensing game. The patent holder prefers complete technology diffusion rather than exclusive licensing except if the innovation size is big and the market competition is strong.

7
Notice that the patent holder’s preferences towards technology diffusion are independent of the bargaining power. The patent holder appropriates a share $\alpha$ of the profits, so that the higher the profits of the firms are the higher the revenue of the patent holder is. When market competition is mild ($\gamma$ small), both firms make high profits so that the patent holder prefers to sell two licenses. In contrast, when market competition is strong and the innovation is almost drastic, the patent holder prefers exclusive licensing because the innovating firm will have a large cost advantage which allows the innovating firm to conquer most of the market. Exclusive licensing is more likely as brands become closer substitutes.

### 2.2 Royalty licensing game

We denote by $R(k)$ the per-unit royalty licensing game where the patent holder decides to sell $k$ licenses in the first stage.

We first consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with exclusive licensing, $R(1)$, where the patent holder and firm $i$ negotiate over the per-unit royalty $R_i$. The negotiation still proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. Thus the predicted royalty is given by

$$R_{i}\text{SPE}(1) = \arg \max \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2(\epsilon - R_i)}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} R_i \right]^\alpha \cdot \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2(\epsilon - R_i)}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^{2(1 - \alpha)}$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is the patent holder bargaining power which is equal to $r_f/(r_p + r_f)$ and the status quo payoffs are zero, subject to firm $i$’s outside option of not buying the license ($\Pi_i^R \geq \Pi_i^R$ if and only if $\epsilon \geq R_i$). Then, the equilibrium royalty is equal to

$$R_{i}\text{SPE}(1) = \frac{\alpha (2 (1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)}{4}$$

if $\alpha \leq \alpha^R$ and to $\varepsilon$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$, where $\alpha^R \equiv 4/(2 (1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)$ is the upper limit on the patent holder bargaining power that guarantees that firm $i$ prefers the Nash bargaining solution to the outside option. This upper limit is increasing in $\gamma$ and $\varepsilon$. If the patent holder is very powerful ($\alpha > \alpha^R$), then the equilibrium per-unit royalty, $R_{i}\text{SPE}(1)$, is settled equal to $\varepsilon$. The patent holder’s equilibrium revenue, $V^{R^*}(1)$, is equal to

$$V^{R^*}(1) = \frac{\alpha (2 - \alpha)(2 (1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^2}{8(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}$$

if $\alpha \leq \alpha^R$  

(5)
and to $\varepsilon/(2 + \gamma)$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$. Firm $i$’s equilibrium profits are equal to

$$\Pi_i^{R^*}(1) = \left(\frac{(2 - \alpha)(2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)}{2(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}\right)^2 \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha^R$$

and to $1/(2 + \gamma)^2$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$. Firm $j$’s equilibrium profits are equal to

$$\Pi_j^{R^*}(1) = \left(\frac{\alpha \gamma (2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma) + 4(2 - \gamma(1 + \varepsilon))}{4(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}\right)^2 \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha^R$$

and to $1/(2 + \gamma)^2$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$.

We now consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with complete technology diffusion, $R(2)$, where the patent holder and firm 1 negotiate over the per-unit royalty $R_1$ while the patent holder and firm 2 negotiate over the per-unit royalty $R_2$. Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. Then, the predicted per-unit royalties are given by

$$R^{\text{SPE}}_i(2) = \arg \max \left[\frac{(2 - \gamma)(1 + \varepsilon) - 2R_i + \gamma R_j R_i}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}\right]^\alpha \left[\frac{(2 - \gamma)(1 + \varepsilon) - 2R_i + \gamma R_j}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}\right]^{2(1-\alpha)}$$

$i = 1, 2, i \neq j$, where the status quo payoffs are zero, subject to firm $i$’s outside option of not buying the license ($\Pi_i^{R^*} \geq \Pi_i^{R}$ if and only if $\varepsilon \geq R_i$). Then, the equilibrium royalties are equal to

$$R^{\text{SPE}}_i(2) = \frac{\alpha(2 - \alpha)(1 + \varepsilon)}{(4 - \alpha \gamma)} \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha^R$$

and to $\varepsilon$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$, $i = 1, 2$. The patent holder’s equilibrium revenue, $V^{R^*}(2)$, is equal to

$$V^{R^*}(2) = \frac{\alpha(2 - \alpha)(2 - \gamma)(1 + \varepsilon)^2}{(2 + \gamma)(4 - \alpha \gamma)^2} \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha^R$$

and to $2\varepsilon/(2 + \gamma)^2$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$. Firms’ equilibrium profits are equal to

$$\Pi_i^{R^*}(2) = \left(\frac{8(1 + \varepsilon) - 4((1 + \varepsilon)\alpha + \gamma) + \alpha \gamma^2}{(4 - \alpha \gamma)(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)}\right)^2 \text{ if } \alpha \leq \alpha^R$$

and to $1/(2 + \gamma)^2$ if $\alpha > \alpha^R$. As long as the patent holder is not too powerful ($\alpha \leq \alpha^R$), the equilibrium per-unit royalty is increasing in $\alpha$ and $\varepsilon$ but decreasing in $\gamma$. Notice that $R^{\text{SPE}}_i(1) \geq R^{\text{SPE}}_i(2)$. Comparing $V^{R^*}(1)$ with $V^{R^*}(2)$ we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider the royalty licensing game. The patent holder prefers exclusive licensing rather than complete technology diffusion as long as the patent holder’s bargaining power is not too strong, \( \alpha \leq \alpha^R \). Complete technology diffusion arises when the patent holder is very powerful, \( \alpha > \alpha^R \).

When the patent holder is very powerful (\( \alpha > \alpha^R \)), the negotiation leads to a royalty equal to the innovation size, independently of the degree of product differentiation (\( \gamma \)). Hence, the patent holder prefers to sell licenses to both firms. In contrast, when the bargaining power of the patent holder is weak, the equilibrium royalty rate depends on the toughness of the market competition. In particular, the patent holder can negotiate a higher price under exclusive licensing because the innovating firm, thanks to the cost advantage which is increasing with the competition, makes higher profits and can afford a higher marginal cost. The more competitive the market and the larger the innovation size, the more likely exclusive licensing will be chosen (as \( \alpha^R \) is increasing in \( \gamma \) and \( \varepsilon \)).

2.3 Fixed fee versus royalty

Which mode of licensing does the patent holder prefer under complete information? Remember that \( \varepsilon^F(\gamma) \) (whose expression is given in Appendix A) is the cut-off value on \( \varepsilon \) such that, in case of licensing by means of fixed fees, the patent holder prefers exclusive licensing to complete technology diffusion if and only if \( \varepsilon > \varepsilon^F(\gamma) \). This cut-off value, \( \varepsilon^F(\gamma) \), decreases with \( \gamma \).

Proposition 1. The patent holder prefers to negotiate royalties if and only if \( \gamma < 2(\sqrt{1 - \alpha + \alpha - 1})/\alpha \) and \( \varepsilon < \alpha(2 - \gamma)/(4 - 2\alpha) < \varepsilon^F(\gamma) \). In addition, the patent holder prefers to choose complete technology diffusion if and only if \( \varepsilon < \varepsilon^F(\gamma) \).

Thus, in case of differentiated brands (\( \gamma < 1 \)), the patent holder prefers to negotiate royalties when the market competition is mild (\( \gamma < 2(\sqrt{1 - \alpha + \alpha - 1})/\alpha \)) and the innovation size is small (\( \varepsilon < \alpha(2 - \gamma)/(4 - 2\alpha) \)). Notice that \( \alpha(2 - \gamma)/(4 - 2\alpha) \) increases with \( \alpha \) but \( 2(\sqrt{1 - \alpha + \alpha - 1})/\alpha \) decreases with \( \alpha \). Hence, as the patent holder has almost all bargaining power (\( \alpha \to 1 \)), licensing by means of royalties tends to be never optimal.\(^7\) However, in case of homogeneous brands (\( \gamma = 1 \)), the patent holder always prefers to negotiate fixed fees whatever the bargaining.

\(^7\)In case of Bertrand competition, Muto (1993) has shown that licensing by means of royalties is more profitable when the innovation size is small and the patent holder has full bargaining power. Indeed, higher prices can compensate for higher royalty costs under Bertrand competition.
power of the patent holder. Moreover, if the innovation size is not too large ($\varepsilon < \varepsilon^F(\gamma = 1) \simeq 0.707$), then the patent holder chooses complete technology diffusion. Otherwise, the patent holder sells an exclusive license. The intuition is as follows. A per-unit royalty rate represents an additional marginal cost of production for the firms; hence, decreasing their profits. When market competition is very tough, as it is under homogeneous brands, the patent holder prefers to bargain a fixed fee rather than a per-unit royalty because the fixed fee allows the patent holder to appropriate a higher share of the profits.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Corollary 1.} Suppose that firms are producing homogeneous brands, $\gamma = 1$. In case of bargaining with complete information, the patent holder prefers licensing by means of fixed fees to licensing by means of per-unit royalties.

3 Bargaining with private information

3.1 Perfect Bayesian equilibria

Both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and Rubinstein’s model predict efficient outcomes of the bargaining process (in particular, agreement is reached immediately). This is not true if we introduce incomplete information into the bargaining. In this case, the early rounds of negotiation are used for information transmission between the two negotiators. We now suppose that negotiators have private information. Neither negotiator knows the impatience (or discount rate) of the other party. It is common knowledge that the firm’s discount rate is included in the set $[r^f_p, r^f_I]$, where $0 < r^f_p \leq r^f_I$, and that the patent holder’s discount rate is included in the set $[r^p_f, r^p_I]$, where $0 < r^p_p \leq r^p_I$. The superscripts ”I” and ”P” identify the most impatient and most patient types, respectively. The types are independently drawn from the set $[r^p_i, r^I_i]$ according to the probability distribution $p_i$, for $i = p, f$. We allow for general distributions over discount rates. This uncertainty implies bounds on the patent holder’s bargaining power which are denoted by $\alpha = r^p_f/(r^I_p + r^p_f)$ and $\bar{\alpha} = r^I_f/(r^p_p + r^I_f)$. We assume that the upper bound on the patent holder bargaining power is below some critical level, $\bar{\alpha} < \alpha^F$. This assumption guarantees that firms do not take their outside options when bargaining occurs in the presence of private information.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{8}This result is in line with previous literature on optimal licensing (see Kamien (1992), Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) and Kamien and Tauman (2002)), and so it is robust to any level of the bargaining power when fixed fees and royalties are outcomes of negotiations.
Lemma 3. Consider the bargaining with private information in which the distributions \( p_p \) and \( p_f \) are common knowledge, and in which the period length shrinks to zero. For any perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), the payoff of the patent holder belongs to \([V^*(\alpha), V^*(\overline{\alpha})]\) and the payoff of firm \( i \) belongs to \([\Pi_1^*(\overline{\alpha}), \Pi_1^*(\alpha)]\).

The proof of this lemma as well as of Lemma 4 may be found in Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2005). In Lemma 3, \( V^*(\alpha) \) and \( \Pi_1^*(\alpha) \) denote, respectively, the SPE utility of the patent holder and the SPE profit of firm \( i \) of the complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the patent holder’s bargaining power is \( \alpha = \alpha \). In case of exclusive licensing by means of a fixed fee, then \( V^*(\alpha) \) and \( \Pi_1^*(\alpha) \) are given, respectively, by Expressions (1) and (2) with \( \alpha = \alpha \). In case of complete technology diffusion by means of fixed fees, then \( V^*(\alpha) \) and \( \Pi_1^*(\alpha) \) are given, respectively, by Expressions (3) and (4) with \( \alpha = \alpha \). In case of exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty, then \( V^*(\alpha) \) and \( \Pi_1^*(\alpha) \) are given, respectively, by Expressions (5) and (6) with \( \alpha = \alpha \). In case of complete technology diffusion by means of per-unit royalties, then \( V^*(\alpha) \) and \( \Pi_1^*(\alpha) \) are given, respectively, by Expressions (7) and (8) with \( \alpha = \alpha \). Similarly for \( \alpha = \overline{\alpha} \). Lemma 3 follows from Watson’s (1998) analysis of Rubinstein’s alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. Lemma 3 is not a direct corollary to Watson (1998) Theorem 1 because Watson’s work focuses on linear preferences, but the analysis can be modified to handle the present case. Translating Watson (1998) Theorem 2 to our framework completes the characterization of the PBE payoffs.

Lemma 4. Consider the bargaining with private information in which the period length shrinks to zero. For any \( \overline{V} \in [V^*(\alpha), V^*(\overline{\alpha})] \), \( \overline{\Pi}_i \in [\Pi_1^*(\overline{\alpha}), \Pi_1^*(\alpha)] \), there exists distributions \( p_p \) and \( p_f \), and a PBE such that the PBE payoffs are \( \overline{V} \) and \( \overline{\Pi}_i \).

In other words, whether or not all payoffs within the intervals given in Lemma 3 are possible depends on the distributions over types. As Watson (1998) stated, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 establish that “each player will be no worse than he would be in equilibrium if it were common knowledge that he were his least patient type and the opponent were his most patient type. Furthermore, each player will be no
better than he would be in equilibrium with the roles reversed”. Since we allow for
general distributions over types, multiplicity of PBE is not an exception. There are
PBE in which the outcome is close to the upper bound, and there are PBE in which
the outcome is close to the lower bound.

In complete information, the patent holder prefers to license by means of fixed
fees when market competition is strong or when the innovation size is large. But,
from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, it follows that once the patent holder and the firms
have private information, this complete information result does not necessarily hold.
Suppose that firms are producing homogeneous brands, $\gamma = 1$. Suppose that the
patent holder chooses to negotiate a fixed fee. In case of non-exclusive licensing, the
patent holder and the firms may reach a fixed fee agreement close to the lower bound
$V^F \left( 2, \omega \right)$, i.e. the outcome of the complete information game when it is known
that the patent holder bargaining power is $\omega$. For instance, the firm may decide
to update much more optimistically its beliefs about the patent holder bargaining
power (putting probability one on the patent holder’s weakest type) in the case
the patent holder deviates from the equilibrium path. The new beliefs lead to a
continuation game in which the patent holder’s prospects have diminished, which
deters deviation in the first place and supports the equilibrium close to the lower
bound.\footnote{Perfect Bayesian equilibrium allows great latitude for such revision of beliefs, because it occurs
off the equilibrium path.} Suppose now that the patent holder chooses to negotiate a per-unit royalty
and to sell only one license. Choosing an alternative mode of licensing modifies
the bargaining environment and can induce the bargaining process to switch to an
equilibrium close to the upper bound $V^R \left( 1, \bar{\omega} \right)$, i.e. the outcome of the complete
information game when it is known that the patent holder bargaining power is $\bar{\omega}$.
Since the upper bound on the patent holder’s revenue under exclusive licensing by
means of a per-unit royalty, $V^R \left( 1, \bar{\omega} \right)$, is greater than the lower bound on the patent
holder’s revenue under non-exclusive licensing by means of fixed fees, $V^F \left( 2, \omega \right)$, the
patent holder may prefer exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty to non-
exclusive licensing by means of fixed fees.

\textbf{Corollary 2.} Suppose that firms are producing homogeneous brands, $\gamma = 1$. In
case of bargaining with private information, the patent holder may prefer exclusive
licensing by means of a per-unit royalty to exclusive or non-exclusive licensing by
means of fixed fees.

However, once it is common knowledge that the patent holder is stronger than
the firm \((\alpha > 1/2)\), we recover the complete information result. Incomplete information in the model takes into account two main features. The first one is the amount of private information in possession of the players. By the amount of private information we mean the size of the set in which player’s discount rate is contained and which is common knowledge between the players. The second one is the uncertainty about who is the more patient player, i.e. who has more bargaining power. When it is common knowledge that the patent holder is stronger than the firm, this second feature disappears, and information tends to play a less crucial role in the process of the negotiation between the patent holder and the firms.

3.2 Bargaining with almost complete information

The previous analysis establishes bounds on the PBE payoffs, but it says nothing about the possible payoff vectors inside the bounds. It would be interesting to study the set of payoffs that are supported by perfect Bayesian equilibria in the bargaining game which is ”close” to having complete information. Watson (1998) has also studied the PBE payoff set of Rubinstein’s alternating-offer game under arbitrary sequences of distributions over the players’ types which have the same (possibly wide) support,\(^{11}\) yet which converge to a point mass distribution. That is, he has examined bargaining games in which with high probability a player’s discount rate is close to a certain value, yet there is a slight chance that the player’s discount rate is much higher or much lower. He has shown that the set of equilibrium payoffs does not converge to that of the complete information, despite that the game converges to one of complete information. More precisely, the set converges from above but not from below in the sense that a player cannot gain if there is a slight chance that he is very patient (has a low discount rate), yet he can suffer if there is a slight chance that he is impatient. In other words, a slight chance of being a patient type can’t help a player, whereas a slight chance of being impatient can certainly hurt. The limiting set of equilibrium payoffs is defined by each player’s greatest possible discount rate and the limiting discount rates; the players’ lowest possible discount rates do not play a role. Watson’s main result can be extended to our licensing bargaining model. It also furnishes intuition that is meaningful for general distributions.

Suppose that there is three possible types for both the patent holder and the

\(^{11}\)If \(r^P_i\) and \(r^I_i\) converge (for \(i = p, f\)) then the PBE payoffs of the incomplete information game converge to the unique SPE payoff vector of some complete information game.
firm: $r^p_i, r^*_i, r^f_i$ where $r^p_i < r^*_i < r^f_i$, for $i = p, f$. Suppose the distribution over these types $(r^p_i, r^*_i, r^f_i)$ is $(\beta, 1 - 2\beta, \beta)$ for both the patent holder and the firm; $\beta$ is the probability that player $i$’s discount rate is $r^p_i$, $1 - 2\beta$ is the probability that player $i$’s discount rate is $r^*_i$, and $\beta$ is the probability that player $i$’s discount rate is $r^f_i$. Then, we might wish to know how the set of PBE payoffs change as $\beta$ converges to zero, where there is only a slight chance that player $i$ is either of type $r^p_i$ or type $r^f_i$. From Watson’s (1998) Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, it follows that, as $\beta$ converges to zero, PBE outcomes do not converge to a single outcome, despite that the distribution over types converges to a point mass distribution. There are PBE in which the revenue is close to the upper bound $V^*(r^p_i, r^f_f)$ and there are PBE in which the revenue is close to the lower bound $V^*(r^p_i, r^f_f)$.

**Corollary 3.** Suppose that firms are producing homogeneous brands, $\gamma = 1$. In case of bargaining with almost complete information, the patent holder may prefer exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty to exclusive or non-exclusive licensing by means of fixed fees.

### 3.3 Maximum delay in reaching an agreement

Inefficient outcomes are possible, even as the period length shrinks to zero. The bargaining game may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium.\(^\text{13}\) In fact, delay is positively related to the distance between the discount rates of the most and least patient types of the players. If the range of types is reduced, then this leads to a smaller range of possible payoffs and less delay. Delay can occur even when the game is close to one of complete information (as the type distributions converge to point mass distributions). We propose to analyze the maximum delay time in reaching an agreement.\(^\text{14}\) In the appendix we compute the maximum delay time.

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\(^{12}\)This lopsided convergence follows from the construction of PBE strategies, where players will punish one another if they depart from their equilibrium strategies. An effective form of punishment in the bargaining game is that when a player takes some deviant action, beliefs about him are updated *optimistically*-putting probability one on his weakest type. The existence of a very impatient type (a type near $r^f_i$ as compared to $r^*_i$) allows the threat of such a revision of beliefs, however small is the probability of the impatient type. The existence of a very patient type has little effect, since it would not be used in punishing a player.

\(^{13}\)Watson (1998) has constructed equilibria with delay in which the types of each player behave identically (no information is revealed in equilibrium), players use pure strategies, and players make non-serious offers until some appointed date.

\(^{14}\)It is not uncommon in the literature on bargaining to analyze the maximum delay before reaching an agreement. See, for instance, Cramton (1992) and Cai (2003).
delay in equilibrium which shows that an agreement is reached in finite time and that delay time equals zero as incomplete information vanishes (in that \( r_i^p \) and \( r_i^l \) converge).

In case of licensing by means of fixed fees, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is given by

\[
D(F) = \min \{ D^p(F), D^f(F) \}
\]  

(9)

where

\[
D^p(F) = -\frac{1}{r_p^P} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_f^P}{r_f^I} \cdot \frac{r_p^P + r_I^l}{r_p^I + r_f^P} \right]
\]  

(10)

is the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating, and

\[
D^f(F) = -\frac{1}{r_f^P} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_p^P}{r_p^I} \cdot \frac{r_f^P + r_I^l}{r_f^I + r_p^P} \right]
\]  

(11)

is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating. In fact, \( D^p(F) \) is the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating if it were of the most patient type. Similarly, \( D^f(F) \) is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating if it were of the most patient type. So, \( D^p(T) \) and \( D^f(T) \) are the upper bounds on the maximum time the patent holder of type \( r_p \) and the firm of type \( r_f \) would spend negotiating. This maximum time decreases with type \( r_p \) (\( r_f \)). So, the more patient a player is the greater the delay that may be observed. Since \( D^p(T) \) and \( D^f(T) \) are positive, finite numbers, the maximum real delay in reaching an agreement in case of licensing by means of fixed fees is finite and converges to zero as \( r_i^l \) and \( r_i^p \) become close.

In case of exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is given by

\[
D(R(1)) = \min \{ D^p(R(1)), D^f(R(1)) \}
\]  

(12)

where

\[
D^p(R(1)) = -\frac{1}{r_p^P} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_f^P}{r_f^I} \cdot \frac{r_p^P + 2r_p^l}{r_p^I + 2r_p^P} \cdot \left( \frac{r_p^P + r_I^l}{r_p^I + r_f^P} \right)^2 \right]
\]  

(13)

is the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating, and

\[
D^f(R(1)) = -\frac{1}{r_f^P} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{2r_p^P + r_f^l}{2r_p^P + r_f^I} \cdot \left( \frac{r_p^P + r_I^l}{r_f^I + r_p^P} \right)^2 \right]
\]  

(14)
is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating. Since $D_p(R(1))$ and $D_f(R(1))$ are positive, finite numbers, the maximum real delay in reaching an agreement in case of exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty is finite and converges to zero as $r^i_1$ and $r^p_1$ become close.

In case of complete technology diffusion by means of per-unit royalties, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is given by

$$D(R(2)) = \min \{D_p(R(2)), D_f(R(2))\}$$

where

$$D_p(R(2)) = -\frac{1}{r^p} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r^p}{r^i} \cdot \frac{r^p + 2r^i}{r^i + 2r^p} \cdot \left( \frac{4r^p + (4 - \gamma) r^i}{4r^i + (4 - \gamma) r^p} \right)^2 \right]$$

is the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating, and

$$D_f(R(2)) = -\frac{1}{r^f} \cdot \log \left[ \left( \frac{2r^p + r^i}{2r^i + r^p} \right)^2 \cdot \left( \frac{(4 - \gamma) r^p + 4r^i}{(4 - \gamma) r^i + 4r^p} \right)^2 \right]$$

is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating. Since $D_p(R(2))$ and $D_f(R(2))$ are positive, finite numbers, the maximum real delay in reaching an agreement in case of complete technology diffusion by means of per-unit royalties is finite and converges to zero as $r^i_1$ and $r^p_1$ become close. We have that

$$\frac{\partial D_p(R(2))}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial D_f(R(2))}{\partial \gamma} < 0.$$ 

**Proposition 2.** In case of complete technology diffusion by means of per-unit royalties, a decrease in product differentiation (as $\gamma$ increases) increases the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating but decreases the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating.

When brands are substitutable, royalty settlements create spillover effects (by altering the firms’ relative competitive positions in the product market) that have implications for the outcome of negotiations. Spillover effects are decreasing with the degree of product differentiation. Spillover effects create incentives for firms to concede but incentives for the patent holder to make less concessions in order to obtain greater royalties. Hence, it is ambiguous whether $D(R2)$ increases or decreases with $\gamma$.  

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Comparing (11) with (14) and (14) with (17) we have that $D_f(F) > D_f(R(1)) \geq D_f(R(2))$. Comparing (10) with (16) and (13) with (16) we have that $D_p(F) > D_p(R(2)) \geq D_p(R(1))$. The maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating in case of licensing by means of royalties is decreasing with the number of licenses sold, but the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating is increasing with the number of licenses sold. Thus, in case of per-unit royalties, the number of licenses sold has an ambiguous effect on the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement. When the patent holder chooses complete technology diffusion, firms have incentives to concede more rapidly because of increased spillover effects. However, complete technology diffusion raises the potential payoffs for the patent holder, and in expanding the payoff set, also increases the scope for delay (longer negotiations may be needed for screening the private information). In case of fixed fees, the rents to be divided do not depend on the negotiated fees. For instance, anticipating that an agreement will be reached in the negotiation with firm $j$, the negotiation between the patent holder and firm $i$ has no incidence on the payoff set of the negotiation with firm $j$, and vice versa. Hence, the delay in reaching an agreement does not depend on the number of licenses sold but only depends on the private information. In addition, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement in case of fixed fees is longer than the maximum real delay time in case of per-unit royalties. The reason is the absence of spillovers.

Then, we obtain the following proposition.

**Proposition 3.** The maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is longer when the patent holder and the firm negotiate over fixed fees. That is, $D(F) > D(R(2))$ and $D(F) > D(R(1))$.

Suppose that $r_p^F = r_f^F$ and $r_p^I = r_f^I$. Then, comparing (16) with (17) we have that, in case of licensing by means of royalties, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is decreasing with the number of licenses sold.

**Corollary 4.** Suppose that $r_p^F = r_f^P$ and $r_p^I = r_f^I$. Then, $D(F) > D(R(1)) \geq D(R(2))$.

Thus, licensing by means of fixed fees instead of royalties would increase the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement. So, the likelihood of having more inefficient outcomes in case of licensing by means of fixed fees may explain why licensing by means of per-unit royalties is commonly used in practice. We now provide an example of the maximum delay. In this example, let $r_f^P = r_p^P = r_p^F$,
\[ r_f^I = r_p^I = r^I, \quad r^I = 0.36 - r^P \quad \text{with} \quad r^P \in [0.04, 0.18]. \]

Table 1 gives the integer part of the maximum delay for the different modes of licensing and for different values of the parameter \( \gamma. \)

We observe that (i) the real delay time in reaching an agreement is not negligible: many bargaining rounds may be needed in equilibrium before an agreement is reached; (ii) \( D^p \) and \( D^f \) are increasing with the amount of private information \( |r_i^P - r_i^I| \); (iii) \( D(R(2)) \) is increasing with the degree of product differentiation \( (\gamma) \); (iv) \( D(R(k)) \) is decreasing with the number of licenses sold \( (k) \).

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<th>( R(1) )</th>
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Table 1: Maximum delay in reaching an agreement

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We can interpret \( r_i \) as the annual discount rate and the numbers in Table 1 as the maximum number of days needed to reach an agreement. Indeed, the integer part of the maximum delays for \( \Delta = 1/365 \) are exactly the numbers in Table 1. The data in Table 1 seem consistent with the number of days between the date of application of the licensed patents and the date of the licensing contracts as reported in Sakakibara (2010).
4 Conclusion

We have considered a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royalties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We have studied how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We have obtained that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. However, once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. In addition, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties. Thus, the relative bargaining power of a patent holder and a licensee provides another rationale for the wide prevalence of royalties in practice.

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Appendix

A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1.

- Case 1: \( \alpha < \alpha_1^F < \alpha_2^F \). We have that \( V^F(2) > V^F(1) \) for \( \gamma < 0.585 \). For \( \gamma > 0.585 \), we have

\[
V^F(2) > V^F(1) \text{ if and only if } \varepsilon < \frac{2(1-\gamma)(2-\gamma) + \gamma(2 - \gamma) \sqrt{2}}{2(4\gamma - \gamma^2 - 2)} \equiv \varepsilon^F(\gamma).
\]
Notice that $\varepsilon^F(\gamma)$ is a decreasing function of $\gamma$. In particular, $\varepsilon^F(1) = 0.707$ and $\varepsilon^F(\gamma) < 1$ if and only if $\gamma > 0.91$. Therefore, only for high values of $\gamma$ and $\varepsilon$, we have $V^F(1) > V^F(2)$.

- **Case 2:** $\alpha_1^F \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_2^F$. We have that
  \[
  V^F(2) - V^F(1) = \frac{2\alpha (1 + \varepsilon)^2}{(2 + \gamma)^2} - \frac{4(2 - \gamma + \varepsilon)\varepsilon}{(2 + \gamma)^2 (2 - \gamma)^2} > 0
  \]
  if and only if
  \[
  \alpha > \frac{2(2 - \gamma + \varepsilon)\varepsilon}{(1 + \varepsilon)^2 (2 - \gamma)^2} = \alpha^T < \alpha_2^F.
  \]
  Notice that $\alpha^T < \alpha_1^F$ if and only if $\varepsilon < \varepsilon^F(\gamma)$. Thus, if $\varepsilon < \varepsilon^F(\gamma)$ then $V^F(1) < V^F(2)$; otherwise, $V^F(1) < V^F(2)$ for $\alpha > \alpha^T$ and $V^F(1) > V^F(2)$ for $\alpha < \alpha^T$.

- **Case 3:** $\alpha > \alpha_2^F$. We have that
  \[
  V^F(2) - V^F(1) = \frac{4(2 - \gamma + \varepsilon - 2\varepsilon\gamma)\varepsilon}{(2 + \gamma)^2 (2 - \gamma)^2} > 0.
  \]

**Proof of Lemma 2.**

- **Case 1:** $\alpha \leq \alpha^R$. We have that $V^R(1) - V^R(2) > 0$ if and only if $(2 - \alpha) \cdot [(\gamma - 2)^2 (\alpha^2 \gamma^2 - 8\alpha \gamma + 8) + 4\varepsilon^2 (8\gamma (1 - \alpha) - 2\gamma^2 + \alpha^2 \gamma^2 + 8) +
4\varepsilon (2 - \gamma) (4\gamma + 8 - 8\alpha \gamma + \alpha^2 \gamma^2)]/[8 (\alpha \gamma - 4)^2 (\gamma + 2) (2 - \gamma)] > 0$, which is always true.

- **Case 2:** $\alpha > \alpha^R$. We have $V^R(1) - V^R(2) = (-\varepsilon)/(\gamma + 2) < 0$.

**Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.** We only give the proof for the case of homogeneous brands. The general proof involves tedious comparisons and is available from the authors upon request. Let $\gamma = 1$. We already know that $\alpha_1^F < \alpha_2^F < \alpha^R$ and $\alpha^T < \alpha^R$.

- **Case 1:** $\alpha^R < \alpha < 1$ and $\varepsilon < 0.707$. From Lemma 1 we have that $V^F(2) > V^F(1)$. From Lemma 2 we have that $V^R(2) > V^R(1)$. For $\gamma = 1$, we have $V^F(2) - V^R(2) = 2\varepsilon/9 > 0$. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell two licenses by means of fixed fees.
Case 2: $\alpha_2^F < \alpha < \alpha^R$ and $\varepsilon < 0.707$. From Lemma 1 we have that $V^F(2) > V^F(1)$. From Lemma 2 we have that $V^R(2) < V^R(1)$. For $\gamma = 1$, we have $V^F(2) - V^R(1) = (64\varepsilon - 3\alpha(2 - \alpha)(1 + 2\varepsilon)^2)/72 > 0$ since $\alpha < \alpha^R$. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell two licenses by means of fixed fees.

Case 3: $0 < \alpha < \alpha^F_2$ and $\varepsilon < 0.707$. From Lemma 1 we have that $V^F(2) > V^F(1)$. From Lemma 2 we have that $V^R(2) < V^R(1)$. For $\gamma = 1$, we have $V^F(2) - V^R(1) = (16(1 + \varepsilon)^2 - (2 - \alpha)(1 + 2\varepsilon)^2)/72 > 0$. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell two licenses by means of fixed fees.

Case 4: $\alpha^R < \alpha < 1$ and $\varepsilon > 0.707$. From Lemma 1 we have that $V^F(1) > V^F(2)$. From Lemma 2 we have that $V^R(2) > V^R(1)$. For $\gamma = 1$, we have $V^F(1) - V^R(2) = (2\varepsilon - 1)/3 > 0$. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell only license by means of a fixed fee.

Case 5: $\alpha^F_1 < \alpha < \alpha^R$ and $\varepsilon > 0.707$. From Lemma 1 we have that $V^F(1) > V^F(2)$. From Lemma 2 we have that $V^R(2) < V^R(1)$. For $\gamma = 1$, we have $V^F(1) - V^R(1) = (32(1 + \varepsilon)^2 - 3\alpha(2 - \alpha)(1 + 2\varepsilon)^2)/72 > 0$ since $\alpha > \alpha^F_1$ and $\varepsilon > 0.707$. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell only one license by means of a fixed fee.

Case 6: $0 < \alpha < \alpha^F_1$ and $\varepsilon > 0.707$. From Lemma 1 we have that $V^F(1) > V^F(2)$. From Lemma 2 we have that $V^R(2) < V^R(1)$. For $\gamma = 1$, we have $V^F(1) - V^R(1) = \alpha(1 + 2\varepsilon)^2(2 + 3\alpha)/72 > 0$. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell only one license by means of a fixed fee.

B Maximum delay

B.1 Fixed fee licensing game

We first consider the fixed fee licensing game with exclusive licensing, $F(1)$, where the patent holder and firm $i$ negotiate over the up-front fixed fee $F_i$. Production and market competition occur only when either the patent holder and firm $i$ have come to an agreement, or when one of the parties has decided to leave the bargaining table forever. The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. The patent holder and firm $i$ make alternate fixed fee offers, with firm $i$ making offers in odd-numbered periods and the patent holder making offers in even-numbered periods. The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the
negotiators accepts an offer. No limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a possible outcome. The patent holder and firm $i$ are assumed to be impatient. The patent holder and firm $i$ have time preferences with constant discount factors $\delta_p \in (0, 1)$ and $\delta_f \in (0, 1)$, respectively. For any fixed fee bargaining which leads to an agreement $F_i$ at period $n$, $\delta_f \cdot \Pi^F_i (F_i)$ and $\delta_p \cdot V^F (F_i)$ are, respectively, firm $i$’s payoff and the patent holder’s payoff. For any fixed fee bargaining which leads to perpetual disagreement, disagreement payoffs are set to zero. As in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), the SPE fixed fee outcome is such that

$$\begin{cases} \Pi^F_i (F_{ip}) = \delta_f \cdot \Pi^F_i (F_{if}) \\ V^F (F_{if}) = \delta_p \cdot V^F (F_{ip}), \end{cases}$$

where $F_{ip}$ is the SPE fixed fee outcome if the patent holder makes the first offer, $F_{if}$ is the SPE fixed fee outcome if the firm makes the first offer, and subject to firm $i$’s outside option of not buying the license ($\Pi^F_i \geq \Pi^F_i$). Notice that $\Pi^F_i \geq \Pi^F_i$ if and only if $4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \geq F_i$. Since the patent holder makes the first offer, the unique SPE fixed fee is given by

$$F_{i,SPE} (1, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \min \left\{ \frac{1 - \delta_f}{1 - \delta_f \delta_p} \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2 \cdot \frac{4 (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) \varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2} \right\},$$

from which we get the SPE profits and the SPE payoff of the patent holder,

$$V^F* (1, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \min \left\{ \frac{1 - \delta_f}{1 - \delta_f \delta_p} \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2 \cdot \frac{4 (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) \varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2} \right\},$$

$$\Pi^F_i* (1, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \max \left\{ \frac{\delta_f (1 - \delta_p)}{1 - \delta_f \delta_p} \left[ \frac{(2 - \gamma) + 2\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma)} \right]^2 \cdot \Pi^F_i \right\}.$$  

We now consider the fixed fee licensing game with complete technology diffusion, $F(2)$, where the patent holder and firm 1 negotiate over the up-front fixed fee $F_1$ while the patent holder and firm 2 negotiate over the up-front fixed fee $F_2$. The negotiations occur simultaneously and the agents are unaware of any proposals made (or settlement reached) in related negotiations. Hence, each pair of negotiators takes the decisions of the other pair as given while conducting its own negotiation. Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. As in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), the SPE fixed fee outcome is such that

$$\begin{cases} \Pi^F_i (F_{ip}) = \delta_f \cdot \Pi^F_i (F_{if}) \\ V^F (F_{if}) = \delta_p \cdot V^F (F_{ip}), \end{cases}$$

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where $F_{ip}$ is the SPE fixed fee outcome if the patent holder makes the first offer, $F_{if}$ is the SPE fixed fee outcome if the firm makes the first offer, and subject to firm $i$'s outside option of not buying the license ($\Pi_i^F \geq \Pi_i^P$). Notice that $\Pi_i^F \geq \Pi_i^P$ if and only if $4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon (1 - \gamma) - \gamma) (2 - \gamma)^{-2} (2 + \gamma)^{-2} \geq F_i$. Since the patent holder makes the first offer, the unique symmetric SPE fixed fee is given by

$$F_i^{SPE}(2, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \min \left\{ \frac{1 - \delta_f}{1 - \delta_f \delta_p} \left[ \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + \gamma} \right]^2 \cdot \frac{4(2 + \varepsilon(1 - \gamma) - \gamma)\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2} \right\},$$

from which we get the SPE profits and the SPE payoff of the patent holder,

$$V_i^{F*}(2, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \min \left\{ \frac{2(1 - \delta_f)}{1 - \delta_f \delta_p} \left[ \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + \gamma} \right]^2 \cdot \frac{8(2 + \varepsilon(1 - \gamma) - \gamma)\varepsilon}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2}, \right\},$$

$$\Pi_i^{F*}(2, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \max \left\{ \frac{\delta_f(1 - \delta_p)}{1 - \delta_f \delta_p} \left[ \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + \gamma} \right]^2 \cdot \frac{4(1 - \gamma(1 + \varepsilon)) + \gamma^2(1 + 2\varepsilon + \varepsilon^2)}{(2 - \gamma)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2}, \right\},$$

for $i = 1, 2$.

Suppose now that the players have private information. They are uncertain about each others’ discount factors. It is assumed that player $i$’s discount factor is included in the set $[\delta_i^1, \delta_i^P]$, where $0 < \delta_i^1 \leq \delta_i^P < 1$, and $(1 - \delta_i^1)/(1 - \delta_i^1 \delta_i^P) \leq 4\varepsilon (2 + \varepsilon - \gamma) (2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^{-2}$ which guarantees that each firm will never take the outside option at equilibrium. Since we allow for general probability distributions over discount factors, multiplicity of PBE is not an exception. From Watson (1998), we have that for any PBE, the payoff of the patent holder belongs to $[V_i^{F*}(k, \delta_i^1, \delta_i^P), V_i^{F*}(k, \delta_i^P, \delta_i^1)]$ and the payoff of the firm belongs to $[\Pi_i^{F*}(k, \delta_i^P, \delta_i^1), \Pi_i^{F*}(k, \delta_i^1, \delta_i^P)]$.

In case of exclusive licensing ($k = 1$), the maximum number of bargaining periods the patent holder would spend negotiating, $I(m^p(F(1)))$, is given by

$$V_i^{F*}(1, \delta_i^1, \delta_i^P) = (\delta_i^P)^{m^p(F(1))} \cdot V_i^{F*}(1, \delta_i^P, \delta_i^1),$$

from which we obtain

$$m^p(F(1)) = \frac{1}{\log(\delta_i^P)} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{1 - \delta_i^P}{1 - \delta_i^P \delta_i^P} \right].$$

Notice that $I(m^p(F(1)))$ is simply the integer part of $m^p(F(1))$. It is customary to express the players’ discount factors in terms of discount rates, $r_p$ and $r_f$, and the length of the bargaining period, $\Delta$, according to the formula $\delta_i = \exp(-r_i\Delta)$, for $i = p, f$. With this interpretation, player $i$’s type is identified with the discount rate $r_i$, where $r_i \in [r_i^1, r_i^P]$. We thus have that $\delta_i^1 = \exp(-r_i^1\Delta)$ and $\delta_i^P = \exp(-r_i^P\Delta)$, for
\( i = p, f \). Note that \( r_i^1 \geq r_i^p \) since greater patience implies a lower discount rate. As \( \Delta \) approaches zero, we have (using l’Hopital’s rule): \((1 - \delta_f^p)/(1 - \delta_f^i)\) converges to \((r_f^p)/(r_f^i)\); \((1 - \delta_f^p \delta_p^i)/(1 - \delta_f^i \delta_p^i)\) converges to \((r_f^i + r_f^p)/(r_f^i + r_f^p)\); and \( \Delta / \log(\delta_p^i) \) converges to \((-1/r_p^i)\). These facts imply that

\[
D^p(F(1)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} (m^p(F(1)) \cdot \Delta) = -\frac{1}{r_p^p} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_f^p}{r_f^i} \cdot \frac{r_f^p + r_f^i}{r_f^i + r_f^p} \right],
\]

which is a positive, finite number. Notice that \( D^p(F(1)) \) converges to zero as \( r_i^p \) and \( r_i^1 \) become close, for \( i = p, f \). The maximum number of bargaining periods firm \( i \) would spend negotiating, \( I(m^i(F(1))) \), is given by

\[
\Pi_i^F(1, \delta^p, \delta^i) = (\delta^p)^{m^i(F(1))} \cdot \Pi_i^{F^*}(1, \delta^p, \delta^i),
\]

from which we obtain

\[
m^i(F(1)) = \frac{1}{\log(\delta_f^i)} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{\Pi_i^{F^*}(1, \delta^p, \delta^i)}{\Pi_i^F(1, \delta^p, \delta^i)} \right],
\]

and as \( \Delta \) approaches zero,

\[
D^f(F(1)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} (m^f(F(1)) \cdot \Delta) = -\frac{1}{r_f^p} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_f^p}{r_f^i} \cdot \frac{r_f^p + r_f^i}{r_f^i + r_f^p} \right],
\]

which is a positive, finite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an agreement is given by

\[
D(F(1)) = \min \{ D^p(F(1)), D^f(F(1)) \}.
\]

In case of complete technology diffusion (\( k = 2 \)), the maximum number of bargaining periods the patent holder would spend negotiating, \( I(m^p(F(2))) \), is given by

\[
V^{F^*}(2, \delta^p, \delta^i) = (\delta^p)^{m^p(F(2))} \cdot V^{F^*}(2, \delta^p, \delta^i),
\]

from which we obtain, as \( \Delta \) approaches zero,

\[
D^p(F(2)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} (m^p(F(2)) \cdot \Delta) = -\frac{1}{r_p^p} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_f^p}{r_f^i} \cdot \frac{r_f^p + r_f^i}{r_f^i + r_f^p} \right],
\]

which is a positive, finite number. The maximum number of bargaining periods firm \( i \) would spend negotiating, \( I(m^i(F(2))) \), is given by
\( \Pi_i^{F^*}(2, \delta_p, \delta_f) = (\delta_f)^{m^f(F(2))} \cdot \Pi_i^{F^*}(2, \delta_p, \delta_f), \)

from which we obtain, as \( \Delta \) approaches zero,

\[
D^f(F(2)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( m^f(F(2)) \cdot \Delta \right) = -\frac{1}{r_p^f} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r_p^f \cdot r_p^f + r_p^f}{r_p^f \cdot r_p^f + r_p^f} \right],
\]

which is a positive, finite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an agreement is given by

\[
D(F(2)) = \min \{ D^p(F(2)), D^f(F(2)) \},
\]

and we have that \( D^p(F(1)) = D^p(F(2)), D^f(F(1)) = D^f(F(2)), D(F(1)) = D(F(2)). \)

### B.2 Royalty licensing game

We first consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with exclusive licensing, \( R(1) \), where the patent holder and firm \( i \) negotiate over the per-unit royalty \( R_i \). The negotiation still proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. Thus the SPE per-unit royalty is such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi_i^R(R_{ip}) &= \delta_f \cdot \Pi_i^R(R_{if}) \\
V^R(R_{if}) &= \delta_p \cdot V^R(R_{ip}),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( R_{ip} \) is the SPE royalty if the patent holder makes the first offer, \( R_{if} \) is the SPE royalty if the firm makes the first offer, and subject to firm \( i \)'s outside option of not buying the license (\( \Pi_i^R \geq \Pi_i^R \) if and only if \( \varepsilon \geq R_i \)). Since the patent holder makes the first offer, the unique SPE royalty is given by

\[
R_{i}^{\text{SPE}}(1, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \frac{(1 - \sqrt{\delta_f}) (2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)}{2 (1 - \delta_f \delta_p)} \cdot \varepsilon,
\]

from which we get the SPE profits and the SPE payoff of the patent holder,

\[
\begin{align*}
V^{R^*}(1, \delta_p, \delta_f) &= \min \left\{ \frac{(1 - \sqrt{\delta_f}) \sqrt{\delta_f} (1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \delta_p) (2 + \gamma) (2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^2}{2 (1 - \delta_f \delta_p)^2 (2 - \gamma)} \cdot \varepsilon \right\}, \\
\Pi_i^{R^*}(1, \delta_p, \delta_f) &= \max \left\{ \frac{\delta_f (1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \delta_p)^2 (2 + \gamma)^2 (2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma)^2}{(1 - \delta_f \delta_p)^2 (2 - \gamma)^2}, \left( \frac{1}{2 + \gamma} \right)^2 \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

We now consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with complete technology diffusion, \( R(2) \), where the patent holder and firm \( 1 \) negotiate over the per-unit
royalty \( R_1 \) while the patent holder and firm 2 negotiate over the per-unit royalty \( R_2 \). Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. Then, the SPE per-unit royalties are such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi_i^R (R_{ip}, R_j) &= \delta_f \cdot \Pi_i^R (R_{if}, R_j) \\
V^F (R_{if}, R_j) &= \delta_p \cdot V^F (R_{ip}, R_j),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( R_{ip} \) is the SPE royalty if the patent holder makes the first offer, \( R_{if} \) is the SPE royalty outcome if the firm makes the first offer, and subject to firm \( i \)’s outside option of not buying the license (\( \Pi_i^R \geq \Pi_i^F \) if and only if \( \varepsilon \geq R_i \)). Since the patent holder makes the first offer, the unique symmetric SPE royalty is given by

\[
R_i^{SPE} (2, \delta_p, \delta_f) = \min \left\{ \frac{(1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \cdot (1 + \varepsilon))(2 - \gamma)}{2(1 - \delta_f \delta_p) - (1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \cdot (1 + \varepsilon)) \cdot (2 - 2\delta_f \delta_p - \gamma + \gamma \sqrt{\delta_f})} \right\}, \quad i = 1, 2,
\]

from which we get the SPE profits and the SPE payoff of the patent holder,

\[
\begin{align*}
V^R_i (2, \delta_p, \delta_f) &= \min \left\{ \frac{4 \sqrt{\delta_f} (1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \cdot (1 - \delta_f \delta_p) \cdot (1 + \varepsilon) (2 - \gamma))}{(2 + \gamma) (2(1 - \delta_f \delta_p) - (1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \cdot (1 + \varepsilon)) \cdot (2 - 2\delta_f \delta_p - \gamma + \gamma \sqrt{\delta_f}) \cdot (2 + \gamma))} \right\}, \\
\Pi^R_i (2, \delta_p, \delta_f) &= \max \left\{ \frac{4 \sqrt{\delta_f} (1 - \sqrt{\delta_f} \delta_F) (1 + \varepsilon)^2}{(2 + \gamma)^2 (2 - 2\delta_f \delta_p - \gamma + \gamma \sqrt{\delta_f})^2} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{2 + \gamma} \right)^2 \right\}, \quad i = 1, 2.
\end{align*}
\]

Consider now the case where players have private information. It is assumed that player \( i \)’s discount factor is included in the set \([\delta^1_i, \delta^p_i] \), where \( 0 < \delta^1_i \leq \delta^p_i < 1 \), and \((1 - \delta^1_i)/(1 - \delta^1_i \delta^p_i) \leq 4/(2(1 + \varepsilon) - \gamma) \) which guarantees that each firm will never take the outside option at equilibrium. In case of exclusive licensing \( (k = 1) \), the maximum number of bargaining periods the patent holder would spend negotiating, \( I (m^p(R(1))) \), is given by

\[
V^R_i (1, \delta^1_p, \delta^p_f) = (\delta^p_p)^{m^p(R(1))} \cdot V^R_i (1, \delta^p_f, \delta^1_f),
\]

from which we obtain

\[
m^p(R(1)) = \frac{1}{\log (\delta^p_p)} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{1 - \sqrt{\delta^p_p} \cdot \sqrt{\delta^p_f}}{1 - \sqrt{\delta^1_f} \cdot \sqrt{\delta^1_p}} \cdot \frac{1 - \sqrt{\delta^p_f} \cdot \sqrt{\delta^1_p}}{1 - \sqrt{\delta^1_f} \cdot \sqrt{\delta^1_p}} \cdot \left( \frac{1 - \delta^1_f \delta^p_p}{1 - \delta^1_f \delta^1_p} \right)^2 \right].
\]

Notice that \( I (m^p(R(1))) \) is simply the integer part of \( m^p(R(1)) \). We can express the players’ discount factors in terms of discount rates, \( r_p \) and \( r_f \), and the length of the bargaining period, \( \Delta \), according to the formula \( \delta_i = \exp (-r_i \Delta) \). Then, player
$i$'s type is $r_i$, where $r_i \in [r^p_i, r^f_i]$; $\delta^I_i = \exp(-r^I_i \Delta)$ and $\delta^P_i = \exp(-r^P_i \Delta)$. As $\Delta$ approaches zero, we obtain

$$D^p(R(1)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( m^p(R(1)) \cdot \Delta \right) = -\frac{1}{r^P_p} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r^P_f}{r^P_p} \cdot \frac{(r^P_p + r^I_f)^2}{(r^P_p + r^P_f)^2} \cdot \frac{2r^I_p + r^I_f}{2r^P_p + r^I_f} \right],$$

which is a positive, finite number. The maximum number of bargaining periods firm $i$ would spend negotiating, $I(m^f(R(1)))$, is given by

$$\Pi_i^{R^*}(1, \delta^p_p, \delta^I_f) = \left( \delta^p_p \right)^{m^f(R(1))} \cdot \Pi_i^{R^*}(1, \delta^I_p, \delta^P_f),$$

from which we obtain

$$m^f(R(1)) = \frac{1}{\log(\delta^f_p)} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{\delta^I_f}{\delta^P_f} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \sqrt{\delta^I_f \delta^P_p}} \right)^2 \cdot \left( \frac{1 - \delta^I_f \delta^P_p}{1 - \delta^P_p \delta^I_f} \right)^2 \right],$$

and as $\Delta$ approaches zero,

$$D^f(R(1)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( m^f(R(1)) \cdot \Delta \right) = -\frac{1}{r^f_I} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r^I_p + r^I_f}{r^P_p + r^I_f} \cdot \frac{(2r^I_p + r^I_f)^2}{(2r^P_p + r^I_f)^2} \right],$$

which is a positive, finite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an agreement is given by

$$D(R(1)) = \min \{ D^p(R(1)), D^f(R(1)) \}.$$

In case of complete technology diffusion ($k = 2$), the maximum number of bargaining periods the patent holder would spend negotiating, $I(m^p(R(2)))$, is given by

$$V^{R^*}(2, \delta^P_p, \delta^I_f) = \left( \delta^P_p \right)^{m^p(R(2))} \cdot V^{R^*}(2, \delta^P_p, \delta^I_f),$$

from which we obtain

$$m^p(R(2)) = \frac{1}{\log(\delta^P_p)} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{1 - \sqrt{\delta^P_p}}{1 - \sqrt{\delta^I_f}} \cdot \frac{1 - \sqrt{\delta^P_p \delta^I_f}}{1 - \sqrt{\delta^P_p \delta^I_f}} \cdot \left( \frac{2(1 - \delta^I_f \delta^P_p) - \gamma (1 - \sqrt{\delta^I_f})^2}{2(1 - \delta^P_p \delta^I_f) - \gamma (1 - \sqrt{\delta^P_p})^2} \right) \right],$$

and as $\Delta$ approaches zero,

$$D^p(R(2)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( m^p(R(2)) \cdot \Delta \right) = -\frac{1}{r^P_p} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{r^P_f}{r^P_p} \cdot \frac{2r^I_p + r^I_f}{2r^P_p + r^I_f} \cdot \left( \frac{4r^P_p + (4 - \gamma)r^I_f}{4r^P_p + (4 - \gamma)r^I_f} \right)^2 \right].$$
which is a positive, finite number. The maximum number of bargaining periods firm $i$ would spend negotiating, $I(m^f(R(2)))$, is given by

$$
\Pi_i^R(2, \delta_p^i, \delta_f^i) = (\delta_p^i)^{m^f(R(2))} \cdot \Pi_i^{R^*}(2, \delta_p^i, \delta_f^i),
$$

from which we obtain

$$
m^f(R(2)) = \frac{1}{\log(\delta_f^i)} \cdot \log \left[ \frac{\delta_f^i}{\delta_f^p} \cdot \left(1 - \sqrt{\delta_f^i \delta_p^i} \right)^2 \cdot \left( \frac{2(1 - \delta_f^i \delta_p^i) - \gamma \left(1 - \sqrt{\delta_f^i} \right)}{2(1 - \delta_f^i \delta_p^i) - \gamma \left(1 - \sqrt{\delta_f^i} \right)} \right)^2 \right],
$$

and as $\Delta$ approaches zero,

$$
D^f(R(2)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( m^f(R(2)) \cdot \Delta \right) = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \log \left[ \left( \frac{2r_p^i + r_f^i}{2r_p^i + r_f^i} \right)^2 \cdot \left( \frac{r_p^i + r_f^i}{r_f^i + r_p^i} \right)^2 \right],
$$

which is a positive, finite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an agreement is given by

$$
D(R(2)) = \min \{D^p(R(2)), D^f(R(2))\}.
$$

References


